us are prepared, and even prefer, for instance, in estimating a normal ,u, to consider our statements as relating to a reference set in which the estimated precision s/-Vn is fixed and the population a is regarded as variable. The interpretation is still in terms of relative frequency, with its obj ectivistic connotations. To deny that such an interpretation is a frequency interpretation is to suggest that those who, like myself, prefer it, are somehow committed thereby to an exclusively subjective view of probability, or that we do not subscribe to the law of large numbers.
One may suspect that the insistence by the N (P)Wt school on their special form of frequency interpretation arises partly from confusion between the planning and the inference stage of an investigation, and partly from confusion of the fully and exactly parameterized inferences at issue here with the simple test of significance and procedures related to it. In the latter case, where the likelihood ratio obviously does not exist, we may need to know the stopping rule to guard against, for example, mistaken interpretations of procedures in which observations continue until an observed mean differs from zero by a fixed multiple of its standard error. possessed this anticipatory frequentiest property. Kiefer has decisively demonstrated that this is not so. The key step is to anticipate from the outset the class of conditioning statements which will later be made. In this fashion the apparent paradox can thus be resolved. Furthermore, as Kiefer discusses here and demonstrates elsewhere (Kiefer 1976 (Kiefer , 1977 , a potentially satisfactory theory can be developed, at least for multidecision problems involving simple hypotheses.
However, it is my feeling that the theory is still incomplete. True, the conditioning is anticipated. However, there is no provision allowing for an accurate anticipation of the goals for such confidence statements.
Consider the problem discussed in Section 6 ) His point of view is the conservative one that it is a benefit that the conditional coverage is >F + e given (X, s) E C. Basically, I agree with this part of his point of view. After all, the usual definition of a F confidence set requires only that the probability of covering the true value be at least r; not that it be exactly r (or even that its infimum be F). See, e.g., Lehmann (1959, p. 193) .
But again, the proper frequentist interpretation must anticipate the possibility that (X, s) EL C. Robinson plays down the existence of this "negatively biased semi-relevant" subset, C, for which the conditional probability of coverage is always <F' but the supremum is F. This is not justified. By the same conservative logic and definition of F confidence, one is led to the necessity of quoting the infimum of the conditional coverage given (X, s) g C. Take n = 2 for simplicity of computation. Then, for the usual 90 percent interval, X +4 6.31s, the conditioning IX/s I < 12.7 as suggested in Brown (1967 Kiefer also raises the possibility that the statistician may wish to use procedures which estimate the conditional confidence, rather than state its exact value (or its approximate value as one might do in sequential problems with calculations neglecting overshoot). The suggestion is an interesting one and should be a challenge for future research. Kiefer's development of this idea is as yet unsatisfactory when compared to the presentation of conditional confidence procedures in the body of his paper. The formulation is not yet anticipatory in a way which leads to a suitable frequentist comparison of various procedures. There are various ways in which this may be corrected. For example, one might include as an additional component of the loss function a cost due to making an incorrect estimate of the conditional confidence (depending on the difference between the true and estimated values). In theory, various procedures could then be compared on frequentist grounds. The computations required appear to us to be extremely difficult. Furthermore, it is not clear to us that a loss function like that described previously really fits the practical situations which call for estimated conditional confidence. Clearly, considerably more thought concerning the formulation and more mathematical analysis will be required to begin to develop this interesting and challenging suggestion.
